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Abstract

Nationals Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) provides the risk management framework
(RMF) as described in special publication, SP 800-12
rev 1, An Introduction to Information Security [21],
SP 800-37 rev 2, Risk Management Framework for
Information Systems and Organizations: A System
Life Cycle Approach for Security and Privacy [23],
and SP 800-53 rev 5 (draft), Security and Privacy
Controls for Information Systems and Organizations
[24].
A similar process is outlined by the
International
Standards
Organization
(ISO).
ISO 27001:2013 Information technology -- Security
techniques -- Information security management
systems – Requirements [7] and ISO 7005:2018,
Information technology -- Security techniques -Information security risk management [8].
While these are fine risk frameworks, they are
generic in nature and are not tailored specifically to
knowledge management, KM, or knowledge systems.
We do not claim that KM/knowledge systems are so
unique as to require their own risk frameworks or that
the above-mentioned risk frameworks are not useful.
We are stating that KM/knowledge system managers
will do a better job of risk assessment/ management
of KM/knowledge systems if they have tailored
guidance, specifically in two areas: threat assessment
and risk analysis. Why do we think KM/knowledge
systems need special guidance? We argue that the
purpose of KM and knowledge systems are to
support the sharing and application of knowledge by
supporting decision making, throughout the
organization to achieve organizational goals. Since
the purpose is to share knowledge the tenets of
information security are inherently at odds with
KM/knowledge systems. It is our opinion that
information security is still needed but should be
applied in ways that recognize the uniqueness of
knowledge sharing and decision processes. Jennex
and Durcikova [18] examined the integration of KM
and security and found that security was not
integrated into the KM job functions. Thus, the
purpose of this paper is to provide specific guidance

Knowledge is the most important asset that a
company can have. Thus, it is imperative that this
asset is safeguarded just like generic information
assets. However, knowledge management (KM) and
knowledge systems are different than traditional
information systems with different threats and
different operational requirements. Information
Security professionals recognize that risk assessment
is the cornerstone to information security. We build
on this perspective and propose that risk assessment
techniques need to be applied to KM too to properly
safeguard this asset. We discuss risk assessment
frameworks and build on a KM/knowledge system
specific risk assessment framework with a step-bystep guideline for KM/knowledge system specific
threat assessment.

1. Introduction
Whitman and Mattord [33] quote Sun Tzu Wu on
the importance of knowing yourself and knowing
your enemy as a key to success in battle, or in
designing and implementing information systems
security. To accomplish the knowing of yourself and
your enemy the corner stone of information
systems/cyber security is the process of risk
assessment. Risk assessment is used to know
yourself
by
identifying
data/information/
knowledge/technology assets (henceforth simplified
to knowledge assets) and assigning. Risk assessment
helps organizations know the enemy by determining
the threats that could attack the organization’s
knowledge assets. Risk management then uses these
inputs to analyze the overall risk to the knowledge
asset and determine the controls to be used to
mitigate or remove the risk. All major security
frameworks include a risk assessment and
management process. For the United States the
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and requirements for KM/knowledge systems threat
assessments and risk analysis. In addition, this paper
is focusing on the risk of knowledge loss from a
human source (we will only focus on this asset).
Knowledge loss risk is defined as the expected
impact to the organization resulting from the loss of a
particular expert or knowledge worker. This is
consistent with the NIST [23] risk definition so the
NIST risk algorithm will be used as the basis for
determining knowledge loss risk.
This paper first starts with an overview of risk
and risk management, threats and threat assessment,
risk frameworks, and knowledge management
(KM)/knowledge systems risk frameworks. This is
followed by a KM/knowledge systems specific threat
assessment that is based on literature review followed
by a KM/knowledge systems risk framework
proposal also based on literature review that
incorporates the KM/knowledge systems specific
risks. The literature review includes analysis of
previous case studies and other research.

2. Background: Risk and Risk
Assessment
The NIST SP 800-37r2 [23] describes risk as the
net negative impact of the exercise of a vulnerability;
considering both the probability and the impact of
occurrence. Risk is traditionally represented by the
following formula:
R(risk) = p(probability of occurrence) x
C(consequence of occurrence either represented by
some value or by a loss function)
Risk management is the process of identifying
risk, assessing risk and taking steps to manage risk by
reducing risks to an acceptable level [23].
Acceptable level of risk depends on the managers of
a organization. For example, for organization A a
loss of $30,000 might be huge risk while for an
organization B this amount represents a minor risk.
Additionally, Smith et al. [28] and Aubert et al. [2]
argue that information systems managers and
researchers traditionally define risk in terms of
negative consequences describing risk as the
possibility of loss or damage and the possibility of
suffering harm or loss.
An alternative view by Billington [3] points out
that, when examined closely, “risk” can actually lead
to both positive and/or negative consequences. In any
particular initiative, he notes, the risks involved could
represent different meaning to an organization.
Billington [3] proposes three dimensions of a risk:

1.
2.

3.

A hazard that must be minimized or
eliminated;
An uncertainty about which path should be
taken and which must be studied to reduce
the variance between anticipated outcomes
and actual results; and
An opportunity for growth or improvement,
which must be assessed to determine how
much
innovation,
initiative
and
entrepreneurship should be exercised.

Viewing risk as something more than a hazard is
highly applicable to risk management in KM [19].
Although KM risks can lead to negative results, they
can also represent significant opportunities for
savings or business development. For example,
losing a subject matter expert who has 30+ years of
experience in a particular aspect of a business (due to
retirement) might be perceived as a huge risk that can
potentially cause a large financial loss. However, this
same scenario might open doors to hiring new talent
that costs less money (e.g., lower starting salary) that
can bring new ways of addressing business problems.
Uncertainty associated with knowledge use, be it
due to rapidly changing technology and storage
media, to misuse or new and unexpected uses of
knowledge or to the basic understanding of the
captured knowledge, is one of the biggest challenges
a KM manager faces. This is the reason why this
paper is focusing on the risk of knowledge loss from
a human source, for example, loss of knowledge from
particular expert or knowledge worker.
A final note on the risk formula shown above is
that it recognizes that determining exact probabilities
and values for consequence is difficult. An
alternative to probabilities and consequence values
proposed by several sources is to utilize relative
ranges or scores for the probability and consequence
value. When this is done, probability becomes
likelihood and consequence value becomes
consequence. This paper, as discussed later, uses this
approach of utilizing scores and thus uses likelihood
and consequence. This also allows a group of
employees to agree on a likelihood and score rather
than for one employee to come up with these values.
While the scoring approach does not provide specific
risk values it does provide a relative ranking of risks
that provides risk management staff with a prioritized
list of risks that allows for the most severe risks to be
addressed first.
Practical risk management bases risk assessment
on the identification and assessment of threats to the
organization’s assets.
NIST SP 800-30r1 [22]
defines a threat as any event or circumstance that can
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adversely affect organizational operations or
knowledge assets. A threat source is an adversarial or
non-adversarial source that could cause damage to a
system by exploiting a vulnerability. A vulnerability
is defined as a security weakness in the program or
an asset’s controls. Threat sources can be internal or
external to the organization. In addition, threats can
be intentional or accidental. Finally, a threat source
can be a natural or man-made disaster. Threat
assessment is about identifying threat sources and the
vulnerabilities they can use to exploit/damage a
knowledge asset. The purpose of threat assessments
is to identify specific threat sources and the
vulnerabilities that would be used to attack the
organization’s knowledge assets. The Risk Formula
and assessment uses the results of threat assessment
by using the consequence/damage caused by a threat
utilizing a vulnerability and the probability/likelihood
of this occurring to determine risk values/ratings.
To assist organizations in performing threat
assessments generic threats are proposed. One such
set is from Whitman and Mattord [33] who propose
12 threat categories:
•
Compromises to intellectual property
•
Deviations in quality of service
•
Forces of nature
•
Espionage or trespass
•
Human error or failure
•
Information extortion
•
Sabotage or vandalism
•
Software attacks
•
Technical hardware failures or errors
•
Technical software failures or errors
•
Technical obsolescence
•
Theft
The purpose of this list of threats is to provide
organizations a guide as to where to look for
knowledge security threats. It should be noted that
this threat list includes technical threats, behavioral
threats and legal threats. It is our purpose to propose
such a list for KM/knowledge systems. Since
KM/knowledge systems primarily focus on providing
knowledge users with knowledge for making
decisions our paper focuses on risks/threats
associated with the capture, storage, retrieval, and use
of knowledge.
Our list considers technical,
behavioral, and legal threats, and are generated by
analyzing how KM/knowledge systems can be
misused or abused with the specifics of how this is
done being presented in the next section.

2.1. Risk Assessment Frameworks
The purpose of any risk assessment framework is
to establish rules for what is assessed, who are the

main actors that need to be involved in this
assessment, creates terminology for assessment,
criteria for quantifying, qualifying, and comparing
degrees of risk, and provides a way to document all
of this [20]. The main purpose of a risk assessment
framework is to establish an objective measurement
of risk so that an organization can understand risk
and take appropriate action to mitigate it and bring it
to an acceptable level.
Information technology professionals can choose
from several risk assessment frameworks [20]:
OCTAVE (Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and
Vulnerability Assessment) and NIST risk assessment
framework, ISACA’s Risk IT (part of COBIT), and
ISO 27005:2008 (part of the ISO 27000 series).
While these frameworks differ some in their
prescription on how to do risk assessment, they all
have the following five parts in common [5]:
•
Development of risk measurement criteria
•
Asset inventory
•
Threat identification
•
Risk score calculation
•
Documentation of existing controls
•
Identification of improvements to controls
Researchers and practitioners have been working
on risk assessment frameworks for the area of
KM/Knowledge Systems. These are discussed below.

3. KM/Knowledge Systems Risk
Assessment Frameworks
Three KM knowledge system risk assessments
have been proposed. Thalman et al. [29], Padyab et
al. [26], and Ilvonen et al. [6] have all proposed
KM/knowledge systems risk assessment frameworks
that are differentiated by the KM/knowledge contexts
upon which they focus. Thalman et al. [29] focused
on the knowledge sharing process context as the basis
for assessing risk and then mapped the traditional
information security framework into a KM security
framework. Padyab et al. [26] also focused on the
knowledge sharing process context and then used
communication genres and the OCTAVE Allegro
risk framework to create a KM/knowledge system
risk framework. Ilvonen et al. [6] expanded the
context of their KM risk framework to include the
knowledge processes of knowledge creation,
knowledge sharing, and management of knowledge;
and then fused it with the NIST SP 800-37r2 risk
management framework to create their knowledge
security risk management framework (see Figure 1).
Ilvonen et al [6, p.13] define knowledge security “as
the managerial process of organizations to identify
threats toward important knowledge and secure the
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knowledge against those threats.” In the first stage,
the business case of the intended KM initiative or
change to the initiative, and a description of what
kind of benefits are sought by the initiative/change
are described by an organization. This is followed by
knowledge identification that can be done in three
ways: (1) examination of different locations, uses,
topics and destinations of knowledge; (2) genrebased approach where different actors and their way
of communication with other actors are identified and
(3) examination of the knowledge systems where the
knowledge resides. Threat identification happens
along the lines of external threats and accidental or
deliberate internal threats to the knowledge assets. In
the risk analysis step, the identified threats are
individually analyzed to recognize what kind of risks
they may cause and how significant these risks are.
Cost/benefit analysis deals with the costs of
implementing controls that mitigate these risks. Step
six, risk controls that need to be implemented are
identified along with a plan for implementing them.
Finally, monitoring which is a crucial part of Ilvonen
et al [6] framework provides the organization with
situational awareness of the risk environment the
organization is facing.
We use the Knowledge Security Risk
Management Framework as it uses a fuller context of
how knowledge processes fit the overall
KM/knowledge systems business processes and is
thus a more complete KM/knowledge system risk
management framework.

Figure 1 Knowledge Security Risk Management
Framework [6]

3. 1. KM/Knowledge System Threat
Assessment
Figure 1 includes threat identification as a part of
the risk management framework. To create a generic

set of threats for KM/knowledge systems we start
with the basic KM/knowledge system processes of
knowledge creation, sharing, and management and
then add a further concern from Walsh and Ungson
[31] who identified three contexts in which
Organizational Memory (OM) could be misused:
•
Automatic retrieval of knowledge may lead
to a routine decision response when a nonroutine decision response is warranted;
•
The controlled retrieval of knowledge may
lead to a non-routine decision response
when a routine decision response was
appropriate;
•
A controlled retrieval of knowledge may be
appropriately activated in an attempt to elicit
a non-routine decision response, but it may
be implemented poorly.
Misuse of the OM occurs when organizational
members self-servingly select knowledge to support
positions that serve their political needs rather than
the organization’s [31]. Also, misuse of OM is a
unique threat to knowledge use. These three misuse
risks are also applicable to KM/Knowledge Systems
as OM is a fundamental and integral part of
KM/Knowledge Systems [16] and as such, OM
threats are KM/Knowledge Systems threats.
We find the main KM/Knowledge Systems
specific threats to be based on a threat analysis of the
Walsh and Ungson [31] OM risk context above as
well as by integrating traditional security threats
(such as those listed by Whitman and Mattord [33])
to KM/knowledge system processes (creation,
storing, sharing, and management) to generate the
below set of KM/knowledge system specific generic
threats.
This list reflects the misuse, abuse,
disclosure, and loss of knowledge within the
KM/Knowledge system and are grouped by technical,
behavioral, and legal threats. Studies that illustrate or
support the identified threats are also liste:
1. Failure to identify and capture critical knowledge
in the knowledge creation process. This has
been observed in several studies: Jennex and
Zyngier [19] observed that large organizations
that relied on humans to identify and capture
critical knowledge often failed to sometimes
identify and many more times capture critical
knowledge. Jennex [10] [11] observed the failure
to identify and capture critical knowledge in an
engineering organization when identification of
what to capture and to what detail to capture
knowledge was left to organizational members
with different levels of understanding the
knowledge. In some cases, very experienced
members failed to see the importance of
capturing sufficient detail to make the
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knowledge useful to less experienced members;
and having less experienced members misidentify critical knowledge because they did not
know what was important. Finally, Jennex
(2010, 2013) observed that many organizations
failed to retain captured critical knowledge after
a change in storage formats. Particularly
observed was the loss of knowledge as
organization migrated to newer versions or
different word processing packages or to a newer
storage media (example is moving from floppy
disk drives to laser disks to USB drives). What
was observed was that organizations failed to
transfer all the knowledge from one format or
package to the newer format or package resulting
in a loss of knowledge that many times was
found out later to be critical knowledge.
•
Technical threats are from using automated
tools to identify and capture critical
knowledge with the vulnerabilities typically
being in the ontologies and taxonomies used
to guide the automated tools not accurately
reflecting the domains being analyzed.
Additional threats are from technical
obsolescence leading to the loss of
knowledge as the organization migrates to
newer technologies.
•
Behavioral threats are from personnel
intentionally or accidently classifying
critical knowledge and not recognizing
critical knowledge, not capturing enough
detail with the knowledge, or failing to
capture it when it is recognized.
2. Disclosing critical knowledge to unauthorized
recipients in the knowledge sharing processes.
Jennex [10] [11] observed engineers sharing
knowledge based on their own opinions of what
was appropriate to share rather than following
organizational guidelines. Jennex and Zyngier,
[19] observed members of organizations sharing
critical knowledge with unauthorized individuals
because the organization had failed to classify
disclosure categories of knowledge. Jennex [12]
observed for crises and disasters the issue of
what knowledge should be posted on social
media and what knowledge should be trusted off
of social media. Walters [32] documents the use
of USB drives to capture knowledge from users
who plug the drives into their system.
•
Technical threats are from exploitation of
communication vulnerabilities common to
all communication systems and is focused
on communication processes specific to
KM/knowledge systems (as an example
consider an organization using SharePoint as

the system for communicating knowledge
with the communication vulnerabilities
being common to both knowledge and nonknowledge applications). Additional threats
are from storage media by not properly
securing access to cloud storage and/or
server storage.
•
Behavioral threats are from intentionally or
accidentally failing to maintain access
control lists for authorizing approved
personnel to access knowledge, posting
knowledge to inappropriate forums, not
following
disclosure
processes,
not
encrypting knowledge in motion, falling
victim to social engineering attacks and
either disclosing knowledge to unauthorized
individuals or allowing malware onto their
systems that are collecting and transmitting
knowledge to unauthorized individuals.
•
Legal threats are from intentionally or
accidentally not complying with disclosure
laws such as those dealing with personally
identifiable information or patient health
knowledge. Other threats are from the
intentional theft of intellectual property and
from the unintentional loss of intellectual
property based on the cloud or collaborative
medium on which it was stored or shared
[27].
3. Losing critical knowledge by not capturing it
from critical human sources. Jennex [15] and
Jennex and Durcikova [17] observed this as an
issue and proposed a process for rating
knowledge sources and their likelihood of
departing as well as providing a score to indicate
the time criticality of taking action.
•
Behavioral threats are from intentionally or
accidentally not identifying critical human
knowledge repositories and taking actions to
capture and store the critical knowledge (this
threat is typically not capturing knowledge
from retiring personnel but also can occur
by not capturing knowledge from personnel
departing an organization for reasons other
than retirement).
•
Legal threats are from intentionally or
accidentally not complying with required
knowledge capture (an example of this was
Nuclear
Regulatory
Commission
requirements on nuclear stations to capture
critical knowledge from employees prior to
large scale work force layoffs).
4. Losing critical knowledge by not storing it on
nonvolatile media or by not migrating
knowledge with changing storage standards.
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Jennex, [12] [14] has reported large scale losses
of critical knowledge due to storage media not
surviving as long as expected. Losses include
NASA losing plans for moon craft, nuclear
plants losing documents stored on older storages
media such as 8, 5 ¼, and 3 ½ inch floppy disks,
microfiche, paper, etc. Additional knowledge
losses were observed as organizations migrate to
newer softwares or newer versions of software,
and changing data storage formats.
•
Technical threats are from the failure of
storage media, hardware, and/or software.
•
Behavioral threats are from intentionally or
accidentally not following technology
procurement processes, selecting providers
without checking their technology, not
planning for obsolescence, not testing
technologies before applying them or while
using them, and/or artificially obsoleting
technologies before age requires it.
5. Giving bad advice by not using appropriate
knowledge. This risk is illustrated by high profile
errors in decision making such as Jennex [13]
report on the conviction of the scientific panel
who told citizens there was little likelihood of a
seismic event prior to the 2009 L’Aquila, Italy
earthquake that killed 309. Vaughn [30] and
Boin and Fishbacher-Smith, D. [4] discuss the
decision making process that ignored safety
concerns from the contractors prior to the 1986
Challenger space shuttle disaster. Perrow [25]
discusses the human errors made that led to the
severity of the 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear
disaster
•
Technical threats are from search tools not
finding relevant knowledge, improperly
prioritizing knowledge, not using integration
tools allowing relevant knowledge to not be
incorporated into search results, and/or using
visualization technologies that influence
decision makers to the wrong option.
•
Behavioral threats are from decision makers
using incomplete knowledge, and/or
inappropriately applying knowledge to
unsuitable decision contexts.
•
Legal threats are from decision makers not
utilizing due care or due diligence in
assessing knowledge.

4. Newly Proposed Risk Assessment
Framework for Knowledge
Management/Knowledge Systems

Ilvonen, et al. [6] proposed a risk management
framework for KM/knowledge systems as shown in
Figure 1. We propose an enhancement to this
framework that offers a high-level KM risk
assessment.
Jennex [15] proposed a risk
management process for assessing knowledge loss
risk with departing personnel. This was a form based
process that walked managers through the risk
assessment process. Jennex and Durcikova [17]
utilized this form based risk assessment process to
assess the knowledge loss risk with graduate students
and found the form based process to be a good
process. Based on this experience and further
literature review provided on both general risk
assessment frameworks and also on KM/Knowledge
Systems framework, we are proposing the following
template for knowledge risk assessment [5]. The
definitions and possible values of each category are
provided in Table 1.
In general terms, an asset can be people,
knowledge, processes, systems, or applications. We
propose that the key asset for KM/knowledge
systems is the knowledge from a particular expert or
knowledge worker.
When creating the risk assessment for
KM/knowledge systems, one would identify all the
different knowledge assets and then identify every
threat to each knowledge asset, following the
categories in Table 1. In general, the impact areas are
one or several from the following: financial
(expenses and revenues), productivity (business
operations), reputation (perceptions of customers and
society), legal (fines and litigations), and safety
(safety or employees, customers, environment). It is
important to note that these areas are not exhaustive,
and that an organization may remove or add areas.
The importance of each area must be ranked as
low/medium/high while keeping in mind that not all
areas are high impact. Next, the impact of each threat
on the asset must be in each are must be evaluated.
For example, business leaders must evaluate whether
a loss of 1% or 5% of revenue is considered to have a
low/medium/high impact. Scenarios must be written
out so that anybody who reads them can follow the
logic or the arguments. The next step is to calculate
the risk score that is the product of the ranking and
impact. This score is meaningless by itself, but very
useful when we compare the impact of different
threats on different assets.
An organization can pick from one to four risk
control strategies: accept (taking no action against the
treat), mitigate, share, or defer. The only threats that
should be accepted would have a very low risk score.
Most of the threats will be mitigated (control(s)
would be implemented) or shared (e.g., insurance
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would be purchased). Examples of control could be
codification of knowledge that would happen on a
regular basis either by automatic agents or by
apprentices who shadow a knowledge worker.
In congruence with the traditional risk assessment
frameworks, the highest risk score threats must be
processed as first and appropriate controls must be
initiated.

5. Contribution to Research and Practice
Creation, storage, and reuse of knowledge is a
source of both short term and long term competitive
advantage for organization [1]. Thus, organizations
need to pay more attention to safeguard this
important asset.
Our contribution to research builds on existing
generic risk assessment frameworks and knowledge
management frameworks to create an easy way to
calculate the risk score for each threat to an asset.
Specifically, we contribute to research in the
following ways: First, we provide an in-depth
discussion of threats to knowledge assets (see section
3.1). Nor the generic framework or the knowledge

management security risk assessment provide such a
guideline. Second, we provide a concrete approach
on how to calculate the risk score by identifying
possible impact areas, rank the importance of these
impact areas, easily score the impact. While the risk
score by itself is not that useful, it becomes very
useful when compared to risk scores of other
threat/asset pairs.
Our contribution to practice is twofold: First, we
provide a business-driven approach to identifying and
categorizing (low/medium/high) the impact of a
threat for five business area – financial, productivity,
reputation, legal, and safety. The impact needs to be
discussed with managers as they are the best
informed what is a high/low impact. Second, our
approach offers a use of a template that can be
followed by both technical and non-technical staff
and thus allows for a faster documentation of
assets/threats, their potential impact, and risk
mitigation techniques.

Table 1 Risk Assessment for Knowledge Management
Asset
Asset Owner/Custodian

Asset Importance
Threat

Threat Description

Likelihood
Impact on

The object of the risk assessment - knowledge from particular
expert or knowledge worker
Owners have the authority to accept risk. Custodian of the asset
are responsible for implementing and maintaining controls that
protect the asset.
Low/Medium/High
Any way an asset could be compromised that would have an
impact on a business. See examples in the Knowledge
Management/Knowledge System Threat Assessment section of
this paper.
____ Failure to identify and capture critical knowledge in the
knowledge creation process.
____ Disclosing critical knowledge to unauthorized recipients
in the knowledge sharing processes
_____ Losing critical knowledge by not capturing it from
critical human sources.
_____ Losing critical knowledge by not storing it on
nonvolatile media or by not migrating knowledge with
changing storage standards
_____ Giving bad advice by not using appropriate knowledge.
Low (1)/ Medium (2)/ High (3)
____ Confidentiality of knowledge
_____Integrity of knowledge
____ Availability of knowledge
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Impact Area

Ranking

Impact

Financial

Low (1)/Medium (2)/High
(3)
Low (1)/Medium (2)/High
(3)
Low (1)/Medium (2)/High
(3)
Low (1)/Medium (2)/High
(3)
Low (1)/Medium (2)/High
(3)

Low (1)/Medium (2)/High (3)

Productivity
Reputation
Legal
Safety

Score

Low (1)/Medium (2)/High (3)
Low (1)/Medium (2)/High (3)
Low (1)/Medium (2)/High (3)
Low (1)/Medium (2)/High (3)

Risk Score
(Likelihood x Impact Score)

Adequacy of Existing Controls

Low/Medium/High

Risk Control Strategy

___ Accept
___ Mitigate
___ Share
____Defer

Risk Mitigation Controls

Description

Control 1
Control 2

6. Conclusion
This paper builds on previous generic risk
assessment framework and the Knowledge Security
Risk Assessment Framework [6] to create the risk
assessment for knowledge management. This
addition to the framework contributes to the current
research and practice, by providing a KM/knowledge
system specific threat analysis and a template that
can be followed to not only capture the knowledge
asset, but also to capture the potential threat, it’s
likelihood, impact, risk score in an easy to understand
fashion that streamlines the whole process. Previous
research that discussed risk in KM did not provide
such a step-by-step approach that is repeatable in any
organizations.
Future research will apply the framework in case
studies, preferably in organizations that have
previously performed risk assessments so that the
results from that risk assessment and the risk
assessment performed using our proposed threat
analysis and risk form can be compared.
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